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Lowell J. Chandler  
 
 In Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the plain language of the Clean Water Act provides jurisdiction 
over indirect discharges of pollutants from a point source into groundwater 
that is shown to be connected to navigable waters. The court found that 
studies confirmed pollutants entering the Pacific Ocean were fairly 
traceable to the County of Maui’s sewage disposal wells. In affirming the 
district court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that Maui County violated the 
Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants into a navigable water without 
the required permit. The court also concluded the Clean Water Act 
provided fair notice to Maui County that its actions were prohibited.  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2014, the  Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club – Maui Group, 
Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association 
(collectively “Associations”) challenged that the County of Maui’s 
(“County”) effluent discharges into four injection wells at its sewage plant 
without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) 
permit was a violation of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).1 The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Hawai’i granted summary judgment for 
the Associations, and the County appealed.2  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and 
granted summary judgment for the Associations on three grounds.3 First, 
the County’s sewage disposal wells were point sources.4 Second, the 
County was violating the CWA by discharging pollutants from its sewage 
disposal wells into groundwater connected to a navigable water.5 Lastly, 
while the County argued uncertainty exists as to whether the CWA covers 
indirect discharges, the court found that the plain language of the CWA 
provided fair notice that the County was violating the Act.6  
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. The County’s Disposal Wells and the Tracer Dye Study 
 
At its Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“LWRF”) the 
County relies on four injection wells for disposing three to five million 
                                                      
1. Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 881 F.3d 754, 759-760 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 765. 
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
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gallons of treated wastewater effluent daily.7 Wells 1 and 2 were installed 
in 1979, and Wells 3 and 4 were added in 1985.8 Prior to building the 
wells, the County was informed that effluent from its disposal wells would 
reach the Pacific Ocean via groundwater.9  
In 1973, an environmental review—confirmed in a facility 
reassessment in 1991—concluded that pollutants from the wells “would 
then enter the ocean some distance from the shore.”10 Additionally, the 
County’s own expert found that “when the wells inject 2.8 million gallons 
of effluent per day [into the groundwater], the flow of effluent into the 
ocean is about 3,456 gallons per meter of coastline per day,” equivalent to 
800 permanently running garden hoses.11 Further, the Associations 
submitted studies and expert declarations “establishing a connection 
between Wells 3 and 4 and the ocean.”12 
Furthermore, in June 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), the Hawai’i Department of Health, and others conducted 
a study (the “Tracer Dye Study”) on Wells 2, 3, and 4 that confirmed 
effluent from the wells was reaching the ocean.13 With the purpose of 
gathering data on the “hydrological connections between . . . wastewater 
effluent and the coastal waters,” the Tracer Dye Study placed tracer dye 
into the wells and monitored the submarine seeps to see “if and when the 
dye would appear in the ocean.”14 The Tracer Dye Study concluded “a 
hydrological connection exists between . . . Wells 3 and 4 and the nearby 
coastal waters of West Maui” and that 64 percent of the wastewater from 
Wells 3 and 4 discharge into the ocean.15 The County ultimately 
“concede[d] that effluent from all four wells reaches the ocean.”16 
 
B. Procedural Posture 
 
 The County appealed three of the district court’s summary 
judgment rulings.17 First, the district court found that the County, via a 
groundwater conduit, was indirectly discharging pollutants into the ocean 
by use of Wells 3 and 4 without a NPDES permit, a CWA violation.18 
Second, although no study confirmed the oceanic connection between 
Wells 1 and 2, the district court held the County liable for both wells 
relying on the fact that the County “repeatedly” conceded at the summary 
                                                      
7. Id. at 758. 
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 759. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16.     Id. at 758. 
17. Id. at 759. 
18. Id. (citing Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. Of Maui, 24 F.Supp.3d 980, 
993, 999, 1005 (D. Haw. 2014)). 
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judgment hearing that effluent from Wells 1 and 2 reached the ocean.19 
Third, the County could not claim a due process violation because it had 
fair notice under the plain language of the CWA that it could not discharge 
effluent via groundwater into the ocean.20   
 
III.    ANALYSIS 
 
Reviewing de novo, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed whether the 
discharges were point sources covered under the CWA.21 Next, the court 
reviewed the County’s contention that the CWA only covers point sources 
that convey pollutants directly into the navigable water and not indirectly, 
as the wells do here.22 The court then reviewed the County’s contention 
that its effluent injections are excluded from permitting requirements by 
the CWA.23 Lastly, the court reviewed whether the CWA provided 
sufficient “fair notice” that the County’s actions violated the CWA.24 
 
A. Liability Under the CWA 
 
To achieve the CWA’s objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 
the Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person.”25 The 
“discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source.”26 A “point source” is defined as 
“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including . . . well[s] 
. . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”27 A polluter may 
obtain a NPDES permit to exempt its activities from the prohibition of 
point source pollution.28 A party is found to violate the CWA when it fails 
to obtain a NPDES permit and “(1) discharge[s] (2) a pollutant (3) to 
navigable waters (4) from a point source.”29  
 
1. The Wells Are Point Source Discharges 
 
In reviewing whether the wells are point sources, the court 
analyzed the definition of nonpoint sources and point sources.30 Nonpoint 
                                                      
19. Id. at 759-60 (citing Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, Civil No. 
12-00198 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 328227, at *5–6 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 
2015)). 
20. Id. at 760. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 762. 
23. Id. at 765. 
24. Id. at 767.  
25. Id. at 760 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a) (2018)). 
26. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)). 
27. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). 
28. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), 1342(a)(1)). 
29. Id. (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 
526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
30. Id. at 761. 
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source pollution arises “‘from many dispersed activities over large areas,’ 
‘is not traceable [to a single source],’ and due to its ‘diffuse’ nature, ‘is 
very difficult to regulate through individual permits.’”31 The court 
concluded that the County’s wells were point source pollutants because 
they were “four ‘discrete’ wells that have been identified and can be 
‘regulate[d] through individual permits.”’32  
 
2. Fairly Traceable Indirect Discharges Are Covered Under the CWA 
 
While the County conceded that its wells were point sources, it 
contended that to be regulated under the CWA, the point source “must 
convey the pollutants directly into the navigable water.”33 The County 
argued that because its wells discharge to groundwater, then “indirectly 
into the Pacific Ocean,” the discharges do not fall under CWA 
jurisdiction.34 However, the court concluded that all that is necessary to be 
liable under the CWA is that there be a “fairly traceable” connection 
between the point source and the navigable water, thereby rejecting the 
County’s argument and the EPA’s position in its amicus curiae brief.35 
 Based on case law in the Ninth Circuit and its sister circuits, the 
court concluded that CWA liability is not precluded simply because 
groundwater played a role in delivering pollutants from the wells to the 
ocean.36 First, the court concluded that, based on Ninth Circuit precedent, 
it was of “no import to us in Greater Yellowstone [Coalition v. Lewis] that 
the pollutants—as here—had to travel through the ground before 
‘eventually, [entering] surface water.’”37 Further, the court pointed to the 
Second and Fifth Circuits, which have also recognized indirect discharges 
from a point source to a navigable water results in CWA liability.38 
 Additionally, the court found Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
                                                      
31. Id. (quoting Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 
F.3d 502, 508 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
32. Id. (quoting Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d 502 at 508). 
33. Id. at 762 (emphasis in original). 
34. Id. (emphasis in original) 
35. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).  
36. Id. at 763 (citing Sierra Club v. Abston Construction, 620 F.2d 41, 
45 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
37. Id. at 762 (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 
F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
38. Id. at 763 (citing Concerned Area Residents for Environment v. 
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding 
collection of liquid manure into tankers and discharge onto fields 
where manure directly flows into navigable waters are point source 
discharges.); Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County 600 F.3d 
180, 188 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding discharges of a pollutant through 
the air can constitute a point source.); and Abston Construction, 620 
F.2d at 45 (holding mining sediment basins designed to collect 
sediment are point sources, “even though the materials [are] carried 
away from the basins by gravity flow of rainwater.”)). 
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Rapanos v. U.S. persuasive.39 Importantly, Justice Scalia’s Rapanos 
opinion recognized “[pollutant] discharge into intermittent channels . . . 
that naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if [point 
source pollutants] do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters, but pass 
‘through conveyances' in between.”40 The court concluded that “Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion demonstrates the County is reading into the 
statute . . . that pollutants must be discharged ‘directly’ to navigable waters 
from a point source.”41 However, as Justice Scalia concluded in Rapanos, 
indirect discharges are also covered under the CWA.42  
 
3. NPDES Applies to Discharge Into Wells Linked to Navigable Waters 
 
 The County next contended that its “effluent injections are not 
discharges into navigable waters,” but are “disposals of pollutants into 
wells,” which the CWA excludes from NPDES permitting requirements.43 
However, the court rejected the County’s contentions, holding that it was 
urging a “‘construction that the statute on its face does not permit.’”44  
 First, the court disagreed with the County’s argument that NPDES 
permitting requirements do not apply to well disposals, concluding the 
plain language of the CWA “clearly” allows “NPDES permits for well 
disposals” that discharge into navigable waters.45 Second, the County’s 
argument that only the State, not the EPA, has authority to regulate well 
disposals was dismissed by the court because concurrent authority exists 
between the state agency and the EPA to determine CWA violations.46 
Additionally, the court recognized that if a state agency chooses to “sit on 
the sidelines,” this does not create a “barrier” to a citizens suit to enforce 
the CWA.47 Lastly, the County’s contention that the Act establishes that 
disposal wells do not require a NPDES permit was rejected by the court 
because the CWA “‘does not explicitly exempt [well disposal] nonpoint 
pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also fall within the 
‘point source’ definition,’” which was the case here.48  
                                                      
39. Id. at 764 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) 
(plurality opinion)). 
40. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743) (emphasis added). 
41. Id. at 765. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D)). 
44. Id. (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. V. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 
863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
45. Id. at 766 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); citing 33 U.S.C. § 
1342(a)(1)). 
46. Id. (citing Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. 
Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1010–12 (9th Cir. 2002); 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1)). 
47. Id. (citing Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d at 1010–12; and Cmty. Ass'n 
for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 
949–50 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
48. Id. at 766 (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106 (2004)). 
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B. Due Process’ Fair Notice Requirements 
 
 The County also argued that the fair notice requirement of due 
process was violated because well exclusion from NPDES permit 
requirements is a fair reading of the CWA.49 To provide fair notice, a 
statute, prior to sanctions being imposed, “must first give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited 
so that he may act accordingly.”50 However, it “does not demand 
unattainable feats of statutory clarity.”51 The court concluded that because 
the CWA makes clear that discharge of pollutants into a navigable water 
without a NPDES permit is a violation of the Act, the County had fair 
notice that its polluting activities violated the CWA.52  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
The court’s holding in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui 
is a decision that has significant implications for the CWA’s reach and the 
permitting status of ongoing polluting activities around the country. This 
holding clarifies that the plain language of the CWA dictates that the CWA 
has jurisdiction over indirect pollutant discharges from point sources that 
travel through groundwater or other subsurface flows and reach navigable 
waters. Additionally, that the court relied on the persuasiveness of Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos is significant because what was 
viewed as a more restrictive reading of the CWA is now effectively read 
to expand CWA jurisdiction through the use of a causation analysis test.53 
Now, regardless of any contrary future interpretation of the CWA by the 
EPA, as well as the plurality opinion in Rapanos, CWA liability in the 
Ninth Circuit arises when pollution into groundwater is fairly traceable to 
navigable waters. 
                                                      
49. Id. at 767. 
50. Id. at 767 (United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark 
Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Graynard v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
51. Id. at 767-68 (quoting United States v. Approximately 64,695 
Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2008); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. and N. Ariz. v. State of Ariz., 718 F.2d 938, 
948 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
52. Id. at 767 (citing Shark Fins, 520 F.3d at 980; Garvey v. Nat’l 
Transp. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1999); and Lee v. 
Eneter. Leasing Co.-West, LLC, 30 F.Supp.3d 1002, 1012 (D. Nev. 
2014)). 
53.    Bernadette Rappold, 9th Circ. CWA Decision Could Pose New   
   Compliance Risks, LAW 360 (Feb. 28, 2018),  
   https://www.law360.com/articles/1015760/9th-circ-cwa-decision-   
   could-pose-new-compliance-risks. 
